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I. Introduction  
Key officials at all levels of government have characterized climate change 
as "the greatest challenge [we have] ever faced."1  An enormous amount has 
                                                                                                                 
 * Steven M. Goldstein Professor, Florida State University College of Law, Visiting 
Professor University of Virginia School of Law, Spring 2009 Semester. I would like to thank 
Jackie Roberts, Director of Sustainable Technologies at the Environmental Defense Fund, and 
Professors Robin Craig, John Dernbach, and J.B. Ruhl for very helpful comments on earlier 
drafts of this article.  Thanks also to Professor Hari Osofsky of Washington and Lee University 
School of Law for inviting me to participate in this excellent symposium, and to the students at 
Washington and Lee for their work in convening the conference.  Katherine Watlington, 
University of Virginia School of Law Class of 2011, provided terrific research assistance.   
 1. John M. Broder, Title, but Unclear Power, For a New Climate Czar, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 12, 2008, at A28, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/12/us/politics/12climate.html.  See also BarackObama.com, 
Obama Statement on Climate Change Negotiations in Bali, Dec. 10, 2007, 
http://www.barackobama.com/2007/12/10/obama_statement_on_climate_cha.php (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2009) (citing climate change as one of the greatest challenges faced); Juliet Eilperin, 
Faster Climate Change Feared, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2008/12/24/AR2008122402174.html ( 
last visited Nov. 20, 2009) (expanding on the 2007 findings of the United Nations 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and alluding to even more rapid changes in 
climate).  Skeptics exist as well.  For example, a March 2009 Gallop Poll reflects the "highest 
level of public skepticism about mainstream reporting on global warming seen in more than a 
decade," with 40 percent of those polled saying the media are "exaggerating the issue."  Yale 
Forum on Climate Change & the Media, Gallup Poll Finds More Americans Say Media 
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already been written about climate change in the legal literature and elsewhere.2 
 Yet it is abundantly clear that we have not yet come up with a coherent strategy 
for tackling this challenge either domestically or beyond.3  My purpose in this 
article is to suggest the overarching importance of three fundamental features of 
rapidly evolving climate change initiatives.   
Part I offers a conceptual frame for developing strategies for mitigating 
and adapting to climate change.  The purpose of this Part is to articulate the 
goals we should pursue in addressing climate change.  While it generally is 
sound strategy to articulate, and be clear about, goals as an essential element of 
policy development, doing so is particularly valuable when the goals tend 
toward the amorphous, such as the pursuit of "sustainable" climate solutions.4   
Part II reviews some of the foundational information policy makers need 
to make sound decisions about climate solutions.  This is an area in which the 
need for information is great but the pace of activity is frenetic and accelerating 
rapidly.5  The goal in this Part is to provide an overview of some of the types of 
information policy makers should develop, and consider, in formulating 
sustainable climate solutions.   
                                                                                                                 
Overstate Warming Risks, www.yaleclimatemediaforum.org/2009/03/gallup-poll-more-
americans/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).  Some skeptics also claim that scientists are being 
intimidated, through loss of grant support, etc., for challenging the conventional wisdom.  See, 
e.g., Former Astronaut Speaks Out on Global Warming, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 16, 2009, 
http://www.bostonherald.com/news/national/general/view.bg?articleid=1152427 (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2009) (citing an astronaut who believes global warming is a "political tool to increase 
government control over American lives").   
 2. For example, a March 5, 2009 Westlaw search in the TP-ALL libraries identified 
6,103 articles that use the term "global w/2 warming." 
 3. See J.B. Ruhl, Climbing Mount Mitigation Because It’s There:  A Proposal for 
Legislative Suspension of Climate Change "Mitigation Litigation", 1 WASH. & LEE ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, & ENV’T (forthcoming 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1376380; see also Michael B. Gerrard, State 
Bar Task Force:  22 New York Actions to Address Climate Change, 241 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 23, 2009 
(noting that New York does not have a "comprehensive climate change strategy that has a 
specific, measurable and binding reduction target").  
 4. See, for example, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OUR COMMON JOURNEY:  A TRANSITION 
TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 2, 3 (1999), for the proposition that goal articulation is important 
generally and is particularly important in the context of sustainable development.  Sustainable 
development has been defined in numerous ways and has proved difficult to apply in the field.  
See Daniel C. Esty, A Term’s Limits, FOREIGN POL’Y 74, 74–75 (2001) ("[F]or all its laudable 
goals and initial fanfare, sustainable development has become a buzzword largely devoid of 
content."); see also infra note 10.  As I discuss in more detail below, efforts are increasing to 
operationalize the concept of "sustainable development."  See infra note 21.  This presumably 
will contribute to enhanced understanding of what sustainable development means (and should 
mean) at a practical level.   
 5. See, e.g., infra notes 7–11 and accompanying text. 
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Part III considers the myriad institutional governance questions we face in 
developing climate solutions.  The division of responsibility in our system of 
government has ebbed and flowed since the country’s founding.6  This Part 
identifies some of the key components of our system of government (and 
governance) and raises questions about whether our current set-up is a good fit 
for developing and implementing climate solutions.  There clearly is 
considerable skepticism that our current structure is adequate, including at the 
highest levels of government—witness President Obama’s very early decision 
to create an entirely new office in the White House focused on climate change 
and to task EPA’s former Administrator to head that office.7  New governance 
structures of this sort raise significant questions concerning the role they will 
fill, their impact on the roles and responsibilities of existing institutions, and 
how the new entities will interact with the old, in the environmental/natural 
resource arena (EPA, CEQ, DOI, etc.), and beyond (e.g., the Office of National 
Security, the Office of Economic Policy, the Department of Labor, etc.).8  
California’s 2008 enactment of Senate Bill 375 (SB 375), which has the 
potential to fundamentally change state/local relations in the land use area to 
address climate change issues, signals that both state and local governments are 
likely to consider modifying their governance structures to address climate 
solutions.  It is likely, in short, that the perceived importance of the climate 
change challenge will lead to significant changes in the shape of governance 
institutions at all levels of government in the United States and perhaps 
beyond.9  It similarly is likely that climate change-related challenges will spawn 
                                                                                                                 
 6. This is true in terms of the distribution of power between the federal, state, and local 
governments.  It is also true for the distribution of power between and among the branches of 
the federal government.  See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macy, Externalities and the 
Matching Principle:  The Case for Reallocating Governmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 23 (1996) (considering "whether environmental policy can be improved by 
reallocating authority for environmental regulation within our federal system"); Richard B. 
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?:  Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation 
of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE. L. J. 1196, 1222–1232, 1244–1247, 1269–1272 
(1977) (discussing the difficulty of relying on state and local governments to implement federal 
programs and highlighting some of the constitutional questions involved); Richard B. Stewart, 
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1676–1688 (1975) 
(examining the traditional model of Administrative Law and its failure to reconcile agencies’ 
discretionary power with legislative consent).   The roles that NGOs play have shifted over time 
as well. 
 7. See Broder, supra note 2, at A28. 
 8. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, "Stationarity is Dead"—Long Live Transformation:  
Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1357766 (addressing the complications of adapting 
American law and policy to perpetual climate change impacts). 
 9. See Alastair Neil Craik & Joseph F. DiMento, Climate Law and Policy in North 
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reconsideration of the appropriate roles for citizens and other "stakeholders" in 
the governance efforts intended to address these challenges.10  The implications 
of all of these moving parts of our governance "infrastructure" for government 
legitimacy, accountability, transparency, and effectiveness are potentially 
momentous. 
II.  Defining "Greening the Economy Sustainably" 
As the title of this article reflects, my purpose is to suggest a basic 
framework for looking for "sustainable" ways to green the economy.  This title 
embodies my view that an important aspect of our challenge in the climate 
solutions arena is to find ways to reduce emissions and otherwise protect the 
environment that are sustainable in nature.  Given the somewhat amorphous 
quality of the concept of sustainable development, I begin at the conceptual 
level, by elaborating on what I mean by greening the economy sustainably, or 
pursuing sustainable development strategies for addressing climate change. 
Professor John Dernbach, the editor of Agenda for a Sustainable 
America,11  points out that there are many definitions of sustainable 
development.  However, he also identifies two key elements of the definition, at 
least as the term is understood internationally.  First, it is important to 
understand the word "development," the word that "sustainable" modifies.  The 
word development includes economic development, as might be expected.  It 
also, however, includes two other key elements, notably:  1) peace and security, 
and 2) human rights.  Thus, the goal of development includes the objectives 
that societies will succeed economically, that people will be able to live in 
peace and with security, and that human rights will be respected.  In short, it 
extends beyond mere economic development to encompass other aspects of 
human existence that world leaders and others have pronounced to be important 
to strive to achieve.12 
                                                                                                                 
America:  Prospects for Regionalism (CEDAN Working Paper No. 2009/1), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1348580 (discussing North America-oriented bilateral and trilateral 
initiatives focused on reducing greenhouse gas emissions). 
 10. See J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman, Massive Problems in the Administrative State:  
Strategies for Whittling Away, 98 Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1280896 (evaluating agencies’ capacities 
and current ineffective approaches to solving massive problems such as climate change). 
 11. See JOHN DERNBACH, AGENDA FOR A SUSTAINABLE AMERICA 5 (Envtl. L. Inst. 2009). 
 12. The literature on sustainable development is enormous.  A February 22, 2009 
Westlaw search of "sustainable w/2 development" in the JR, TP-All libraries, for example, 
identified 8,391 articles.  Definitions of the concept vary considerably.  There obviously are 
issues surrounding the parameters of each of these concepts, but I do not delve into them here.  
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The second key element of sustainable development involves the 
definition of the first word in the phrase, "sustainable."  As Professor Dernbach 
puts it, "sustainable development adds environmental protection and restoration 
to the post-World War II international system’s goals of economic 
development, peace and security, and human rights."13  That is, "sustainable 
development recognizes that the historical goals of development—the quality of 
human life, opportunity, and freedom—should continue to be our ultimate 
objectives."14  But "environmental degradation is no longer the price of 
progress; environmental protection and restoration is part of what progress 
means."15 
In sum, the basic premise of this article is that, in pursuing strategies for 
greening the economy sustainably, it is not enough to look at environmental or 
public health consequences in a vacuum.  Instead, policy makers need to pay 
attention to a range of factors that include environmental protection but also 
include economic development and natural security.  This seems self-evident,16 
but I emphasize the point because it represents a significant change of mindset 
compared with some contemporary domestic environmental regulatory laws 
and policies.17  As those familiar with the alphabet soup of domestic 
environmental regulatory laws are well aware, these laws take a variety of 
approaches to reconciling environmental and public health issues with other 
concerns.  Some embody approaches that, at least at first glance, do not 
necessarily fit within the definition of sustainable development that the world 
seems to have embraced.18  For purposes of this article, this broad focus of 
                                                                                                                 
See, for example, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 2, for more information on the 
meaning of sustainable development.  The NRC notes that there are "differing views about what 
should be developed, what should be sustained, and over what time period."  Id. 
 13. JOHN DERNBACH, supra note 12, at 6. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., RECONCILING ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE at ix (Edith B. Weiss, John H. 
Jackson & Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder eds., 2d ed. 2008) ("Today’s world faces two 
urgent imperatives:  to protect the environment globally and to ensure continued economic 
growth and the eradication of poverty."); U.N. Conf. on Env’t & Dev., June 3–14, 1992, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 
1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) (declaring the eradication of poverty as a necessary 
requirement for sustainable development).  
 17. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Radiative Forcing:  Climate Policy to Break the Logjam in 
Environmental Law 2, 5 (Nicholas Inst. Working Paper No. 08-04), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1307842 (discussing, for example, the need 
to make explicit trade-offs rather than ignore them). 
 18. See e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (noting that EPA 
may not consider implementation costs in setting NAAQS under the Clean Air Act, barring the 
agency from considering any harm to human health that may result from impacts on 
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sustainable development provides the frame for thinking about climate 
solutions that will be sustainable.   
It is essential, in this opening Part on the conceptual frame for moving 
forward, to highlight the uncertainty inherent in the path toward sustainable 
approaches and the sense of humility we should bring to the challenge ahead.  
As the National Research Council (NRC) notes, while it is important to set 
initial goals it is also the case that goals, as well as initial plans for achieving 
them, are likely to, and indeed must, change as we learn more about the task at 
hand:  
[T]he Board’s view [is] that any successful quest for sustainability will be a 
collective, uncertain and adaptive endeavor in which society’s discovering 
of where it wants to go is intertwined with how it might try to get there . . . . 
[T]he pathways of a transition to sustainability cannot be charted fully in 
advance.  Instead, they will have to be navigated adaptively at many scales 
and in many places.19 
So, beginning with this essential conceptual frame that our journey toward 
greening the economy sustainably should be infused with more than a healthy 
dose of humility, but should also incorporate the recognition that, ultimately, 
the consensus view internationally and domestically is that climate solutions 
should be developed mindful of their prospects for contributing to economic 
development, security, and human rights and dignity, in addition to protecting 
our environment and health, I now suggest two foundational features of 
sustainable approaches to climate solutions and offer some preliminary 
thoughts on each.20 
                                                                                                                 
employment levels, ability to access health care, availability of health care, and the like).  
 19. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 3.  A critical element of this frame-setting 
aspect of the task involves development of clear metrics of success so that government officials 
and others have the ability to monitor progress and adapt strategies as needed.  See also N.Y. 
STATE BAR ASS’N, TAKING ACTION IN NEW YORK ON CLIMATE CHANGE 13, 34–35 (2009), 
available at 
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Task_Force_on_Global_Warming_Report, 
which recommends that the New York adopt an overall metric or goal of reducing emissions by 
eighty percent below 1990 levels by 2050, with an interim goal of achieving 1999 levels by 
2020.  The report also recommends adoption of "common measurements" for the various 
programs intended to reduce emissions so that the state can measure progress periodically and 
assess whether it is achieving its goals and whether it should consider adjustments in its 
strategies.  See Michael B. Gerrard, supra note 4 (noting that "without a common metric it is 
very difficult to gauge progress and set priorities" and to also determine the most cost effective 
methods). 
 20. By highlighting in the text the uncertainties that are likely to be a central feature of 
society’s "discovering of where it wants to go" or "how it might try to get there," as the NRC put 
it, I do not mean to be too pessimistic about the possibility of progress in settling in on 
sustainable approaches.  Instead, I anticipate that achievement of rough consensus on the 
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III. The Need for Foundational Work to Understand the Options for Climate 
Solutions and Their Implications for a Sustainable Green Economy 
Moving from the conceptual to the very practical, a second key step in 
developing climate solutions involves the foundational work of identifying and 
evaluating options for reducing emissions, fostering absorption capacity, and 
adapting to unavoidable changes in climate.  This work includes assessing 
options in terms not only of their capacity to reduce emissions and/or to 
facilitate adaptation to likely changes, but also of their potential to create jobs 
and further economic development, foster new technology, be cost-effective, 
and advance national security interests—i.e., to promote development as well as 
environmental protection.21  The good news is that an enormous amount of 
attention is being paid to foundational issues in this realm.  This part briefly 
reviews two examples that are illustrative of the type of work that is likely to be 
quite helpful in moving us forward in understanding our options for climate 
solutions.22 
McKinsey & Company, in its December 2007 report, Reducing U.S. 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions:  How Much at What Cost,23 analyzed “resource 
costs” and “abatement potentials” for more than 250 opportunities to reduce or 
                                                                                                                 
appropriate parameters for sustainable approaches will be an iterative process.  In addition to 
conceptual formulations and re-formulations of the meaning of sustainable development, this 
iterative process is likely to include increasingly specific conceptions of what sustainable 
development means.  The increased specificity used in some contexts to define "sustainability" 
is evidence that this is already occurring.  See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,514, 74 Fed. Reg. 
52,117, 52,121 (Oct. 8, 2009) (implementing a Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan).  The 
greater specificity will no doubt trigger fresh debate at a conceptual level as well as in the real 
world of policy development and implementation.   
 21. See John Dernbach et al., Moving the Climate Change Debate from Models to 
Proposed Legislation:  Lessons from State Experience, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,933, 10,934, 
10,946–49 (2000). 
 22. There are a variety of ways of categorizing the major options.  John Dernbach and 
Seema Kakada suggest that there are four major categories for addressing climate change:  1) 
emissions controls; 2) energy efficiency and conservation; 3) long-term carbon storage or 
carbon sequestration; and 4) adaptation.  John Dernbach & Seema Kakada, Climate Change: An 
Introduction, 72 ENERGY L.J. 1, 8–9 (2008).  They suggest that "the greatest efforts to date have 
been addressed to the first two options."  Id. at 9.  In its recent report, the New York State Bar 
Association divides twenty-two proposals for reducing GHG emissions into four major 
categories: 1) buildings and energy; 2) land use; 3) vehicles and transportation; and 4) other.  
See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 20, at 1.  Other ways to organize or conceptualize the 
options for addressing climate change obviously exist as well.   Many commentators have 
divided the options into two main categories:  mitigation and adaptation. 
 23. See MCKINSEY & CO., REDUCING U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS:  HOW MUCH AT 
WHAT COST? (2007), available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/ccsi/pdf/US_ghg_final_report.pdf. 
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prevent greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.24  These options ranged from using 
different types of energy generation strategies (wind power, biomass, etc.), to 
different options for increasing efficiency (upgrades in different types of 
lighting, etc.), to absorption possibilities such as aforestation.25  McKinsey 
evaluated seven key sectors of the economy:  1) power generation, 2) 
transportation, 3) residential and commercial buildings (including appliances), 
4) industry, 5) waste management, 6) agriculture, and 7) forestry.26  It 
considered both emissions from these sectors and absorption of GHGs. 27  The 
team used a variety of "filtering criteria" in an effort to identify the best ("most 
promising and feasible") options for reducing emissions.28  Filtering criteria 
included the elimination of options in the speculative or experimental stages, as 
well the elimination of options with “marginal costs greater than $50 dollars per 
ton in 2030."29   
McKinsey projected three potential abatement outcomes for each 
opportunity:  a low-range case involving “incremental departures from current 
practices;” a mid-range case involving “concerted action across the economy;” 
and a high-range case involving immediate “nationwide mobilization.”30   
McKinsey then used this information to generate "abatement curves" for each 
of the three outcomes.31  The abatement curve for the mid-range outcome is 
displayed below. 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See id. at xi, 15. 
 25. See id. at 17. 
 26. See id. at 1, 77. 
 27. See id.  
 28. See id. at 15. 
 29. See id.   
 30. See id. at xi. 
 31. See id. at 2. 
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Technologies and Costs for Greenhouse Gas Abatement
32
 
 
The conclusions of the McKinsey report are quite promising.  One of 
McKinsey’s key findings is that it is possible to reduce emissions dramatically, 
with existing and emerging technologies, at a reasonable cost.  McKinsey 
estimates that approximately forty percent of the abatement below fifty dollars 
per ton could be achieved at zero or negative marginal costs; in other words, 
investing in these options would “generate positive economic returns over their 
life cycle.”33   
The cumulative savings created by these negative-cost options could 
“substantially offset” (on a societal basis) the additional spending required for 
the options with positive marginal costs.34  However, McKinsey determined 
that many of the most economically attractive abatement options are "time 
perishable"—i.e., negative-cost options will diminish over time.35  Time 
sensitivity is most apparent concerning buildings and motor vehicles, when 
each year that passes reduces negative-cost options.36   
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. at xiii. 
 33. See id. at xii, 21. 
 34. See id. at 3, 22, 69. 
 35. See id. at xvi. 
 36. See id. ("[E]very year we delay producing energy-efficient commercial buildings, 
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In sum, foundational work involving the relative costs and benefits of 
different strategies has recently been done, with more ongoing, that will help to 
inform policy makers and others interested in sustainable approaches.37   
Assessing climate solution options raises other issues beyond abatement 
curves.  I focus on one such question here, notably the possibility that climate 
solutions may have positive spin-off effects on the economy.38  One aspect of 
this is the role of "supply chains" for different low carbon options in evaluating 
various emission reduction possibilities.  The term "supply chains" in this 
context is shorthand for the steps required to manufacture or put into operation 
different climate solutions.  A significant issue for sustainable approaches to 
addressing climate change involves identifying strategies that will produce 
economic opportunity.  Thus, the inquiry into supply chains raises a host of 
economic development-related issues.  I list a handful as illustrative of the types 
of issues policy makers are well-advised to consider:  
1) Does a jurisdiction have a ready infrastructure to support a supply chain 
for particular green solutions?  For example:  (a) Are there existing 
companies in the area that operate in one or more aspects of the supply 
chain? (b) Is there capacity in the existing work force to help meet the 
needs of the supply chain? (c) Is there existing infrastructure to support new 
businesses that would be attractive to employers—for example, are there 
"brownfields" available as possible locations?  Related, is the jurisdiction’s 
legal structure (e.g., its permitting scheme, legal regimes to facilitate reuse 
of brownfield sites, etc.) appropriate to support different types of activity 
that are part of the supply chain? 
                                                                                                                 
houses, motor vehicles, and so forth, the more negative-cost options we lose."). 
 37. Lessons from the European Union’s Emissions Trading System are likely to be very 
helpful on issues beyond abatement costs, such as the efficacy of different monitoring strategies. 
 See, e.g., LARRY PARKER, CLIMATE CHANGE:  THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EMISSIONS TRADING 
SYSTEM 1–3, 5–8 (EU-ETS) (Cong. Res. Serv. 2006), available at 
http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL33581.pdf (detailing the EU’s climate change approach 
and its progress in meeting Kyoto targets).  State initiatives also offer promising laboratories.  
See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
("There must be power in the States…to remold, through experimentation, our economic 
practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs."); AMY ROYDEN-BLOOM, 
STATE GREENHOUSE GAS (GHG) ACTIONS 1–19 (Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies 2008), 
available at http://www.4cleanair.org/documents/StateGHGActions-chart.pdf (detailing state-
wide climate change regulations). 
 38. There are a host of other issues too.  For example, the McKinsey study points out that 
effective implementation of many of the negative cost options it identified will require 
"overcoming persistent barriers to market efficiency, such as mismatches between who pays the 
cost of an option and who gains the benefit (e.g. the homebuilder versus the homeowner) . . . ."  
MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 24, at xii. 
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2) Does a jurisdiction have other tools or strategies that are likely to attract 
supply chain manufacturers?  For example:  (a)  Are there opportunities to 
use state procurement to attract supply chain employers?  (b) Are there 
opportunities to work with nearby states to create markets that, again, might 
lure supply chain employers? 
3) What is the potential upside associated with particular climate solutions 
and their supply chains?  Is there significant potential for growth that might 
justify state investment?  If a jurisdiction invests money to attract a 
company that contributes to a particular green solution, is there a good 
chance that the market will grow and thereby enhance the likelihood that 
the company will flourish?  For example, a North Carolina lighting 
company, Cree, Inc., which holds key patents on a significant number of 
LED technology improvements, has nearly quadrupled its workforce since 
2002.39  Cree supplied over 750,000 red, blue, and green LED chips to light 
the stadium and aquatic center during the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Cree is 
also partnering with five universities to provide LED lighting for offices, 
parking garages, and dormitories.40  What is the likely community reaction 
to and level of support for particular climate solutions and for the parts of 
solutions a jurisdiction would like to attract?41 
In sum, in addition to reviewing foundational work of the sort McKinsey 
& Co. have done, described above, concerning the abatement curves of 
different climate change solutions, policy makers should also consider other 
consequences of pursuing different strategies that fit within the rubric of 
sustainable development, such as increased economic opportunity.  For one 
recent articulation of this need to consider multiple goals in an integrated way, 
see Green Jobs in New York:  Where the (Green) Economy Meets the (Green) 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See GARY GEREFFI ET AL., MANUFACTURING CLIMATE SOLUTIONS:  CARBON-REDUCING 
TECHNOLOGIES AND U.S. JOBS 19 (Ctr. on Globalization, Governance, & Competitiveness 2006), 
available at http://www.cggc.duke.edu/environment/climatesolutions/greeneconomy_ 
Fullreport.pdf ("Cree holds patents on a large number of LED technology improvements, and as 
demand for its innovative products has increased, the company’s work force has nearly 
quadrupled, from 893 people in 2002, to 3,168 regular full and part-time employees in 2008.").  
LED is the acronym for light-emitting diodes, which the Duke study defines as a 
"semiconductor technology whose application to general-purpose lighting is rapidly growing 
with significant potential for energy savings."  Id. at 10.  The report indicates that, in laboratory 
conditions, LED devices are up to ten times more efficient than incandescent lights.  In the field, 
LED lighting products now are three to four times more energy efficient than incandescent 
bulbs.  Id.  They last up to five times longer than compact fluorescents, the longest-lasting 
lighting alternative.  Id. 
 40. See id. at 13 (discussing Cree’s partnerships with universities including the University 
of California at Santa Barbara and Tianjin Polytechnic University in China). 
 41. The same factors ought to be considered in formulating national policy, just at a 
different level of analysis. 
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Environment (Part 1 of 2).
42  The authors suggest "green collar jobs" as a 
method for addressing economic and environmental hardships through "a re-
innovation of our workforce and a re-dedication to core environmental and 
labor principles."43   
Increasingly, experts are honing in on these issues and providing important 
foundational information that can inform choices.  Duke University’s Center on 
Globalization, Governance, and Competitiveness provides one example in its 
2008 report, Manufacturing Climate Solutions:  Carbon-Reducing 
Technologies and U.S. Jobs.44  Building on the McKinsey report, it reviews 
economic opportunities in the value chains of five low-carbon technologies:  
LED lighting, high performance windows, anti-idling technologies for heavy 
duty trucks, concentrated solar, and Super Soil Systems for hog waste 
management.45  The five technologies were chosen to "run the spectrum from a 
well-established product (windows) to a new solution (Super Soil)."46  The 
report provides an overview of each technology, including the main materials 
and component, a description of the value chain, and an analysis of the market 
structure including a list of representative firms and their locations.47  It also 
includes case studies for several of the technologies.48    
States and others are already well along the way to investigating climate 
solutions.  For example, in January 2009, a New York State Bar Association 
Task Force on Global Warming developed recommendations that the Bar 
Association presented to the governor and others.49  The Task Force 
internalized the need to integrate environmental protection and economic 
development concerns, consistent with the general concept of sustainable 
development referenced above.  The Task Force was "acutely aware" of New 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See Delight Balducci et al., Green Jobs in New York:  Where the (Green) Economy 
Meets the (Green) Environment (Part 1 of 2), 20-2 ENVTL. L. IN N.Y. (2009), available at 
http://lawyers4greenjobs.wordpress.com/green-jobs-position-paper/ (detailing various green 
jobs initiatives). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See generally GEREFFI ET AL., supra note 39 (discussing "the economic opportunity 
inherent in a carbon-constrained world, a world where massive investments in climate solutions 
and related infrastructure will be needed."). 
 45. See id. at 5. 
 46. Id. at 7. 
 47. See id. at 5 (detailing the elements of each industry analysis, as gathered from "a 
variety of secondary sources and direct company interviews."). 
 48. See id. at 19, 34, 45–46, 60–61 (providing case studies for LED lighting, high-
efficiency windows, APUs (auxiliary power units), and CSP (concentrating solar power) 
technology). 
 49. See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 20, at 1–2; Gerrard, supra note 4 
(summarizing the New York State Bar Association report). 
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York’s fiscal predicament; as a result, it focused on actions that "will either 
save money because of their energy cost savings or will have, at worst, a 
modest cost to state and local government."50  It identified twenty-two 
proposals for reducing emissions and otherwise addressing climate change.51  
The National Association of Clean Air Agencies has developed an inventory of 
state initiatives to address climate change.52  The continuing development of the 
types of foundational information summarized above will help to inform these 
initiatives and enhance their value for policy development and implementation. 
While a great deal of rhetoric concerning the promise of "green jobs" has 
accompanied some of this foundational work, 53 cautionary notes have been 
sounded as well.  Concerns have been raised that some policies that purportedly 
seek to promote green jobs may instead be more likely to "generate stagnation" 
and be counter-productive more generally because they "disregard . . . basic 
economic principles"54 and rely on unreliable forecasts.55  One recent article 
concludes by suggesting that "deep skepticism is the most appropriate response 
to the hyperbolic claims of the green jobs literature," and recommends 
"continuing the debate with the facts—not the myths."56  Treatment of these 
challenges is well beyond the scope of this framework paper, but they highlight 
the importance of realistic foundational work in the formulation and 
implementation of particular policy options.  
Another challenge is that many of the initiatives to pursue "climate 
solutions" extend well beyond traditional environmental regulatory approaches; 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Gerrard, supra note 4. 
 51. See N.Y. SATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 20, at 35–56 (ranging from improving building 
initiatives to improving New York’s floodplain mapping system). 
 52. See ROYDEN-BLOOM, supra note 37, at 1–19 (showing state climate change initiatives, 
including offsets of EGU emissions, regulations of motor vehicle emissions and fuels, state-wide 
targets, action plans, registries, and other policy actions). 
 53. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, U.S. METRO ECONOMIES:  CURRENT AND 
POTENTIAL GREEN JOBS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 17 (2008), available at 
http://usmayors.org/pressreleases/uploads/GreenJobsReport.pdf (maintaining that green jobs 
"could be the fastest growing segment of the United States economy over the next several 
decades," potentially generating 4.2 million jobs). 
 54. Andrew P. Morriss et al., 7 Myths About Green Jobs 3, 5 (Univ. of Ill. Law & 
Economics Research Paper, No. LE09-007 & Case W. Reserve Univ. Research Paper Series, 
No. 09-14, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1357440; see 
Andrew P. Morriss et al., Green Jobs Myths 2 (Univ. of Ill. Law & Economics Research Paper, 
No. LE09-001 & Case W. Reserve Univ. Research Paper Series, No. 09-15, 2009) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1358423 (expressing doubts about claims 
for green jobs for a variety of reasons). 
 55. See Morriss et al., 7 Myths About Green Jobs, supra note 54, at 8–9. 
 56. Id. at 5. 
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instead, they require coordination of a wide range of government and non-
government actors operating in or interacting with different compartments of 
the regulatory state.  A question of fundamental importance is how government 
(and governance initiatives more generally) should be structured to maximize 
capacity to implement promising approaches.  I consider this issue briefly in the 
following Part. 
IV. Climate Solutions and Institutional Governance 
Developing and implementing climate solutions poses significant 
challenges for our current set of laws and institutions because it is at the 
intersection of several areas of law and policy.57  Ted Nordhaus and Michael 
Shellenberger make the point in somewhat more graphic or stark terms, as 
follows:  
The ecological crises we face are more global, complex, and tied to the 
basic functioning of the economy than were the problems environmentalism 
was created to address forty years ago.  Global warming threatens human 
civilization so fundamentally that it cannot be understood as a 
straightforward pollution problem, but instead as an existential one.  Its 
impacts will be so enormous that it is better understood as a problem of 
evolution, not pollution.58 
There is, to put it mildly, likely to be substantial debate about how best to 
organize our institutions of governance to meet these challenges.59  And we will 
need to think hard about the adequacy of current governance institutions for the 
task.  My purpose in this section is to identify some of the challenges and offer 
some preliminary thoughts about them.   
                                                                                                                 
 57. See John C. Dernbach & Seema Kakade, Climate Change Law: An Introduction, 29 
ENERGY L. J. 1, 2, 20 (2008) (including the realms of environmental, energy, business, and 
international law, in addition to complex policy arenas such as federalism). 
 58. TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, BREAK THROUGH:  FROM THE DEATH OF 
ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY 8 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2007). 
 59. As J.B. Ruhl and Jim Salzman point out, there is also likely to be substantial debate 
about the approaches and tools key actors should use to address the challenges we face.  They 
suggest that we may need to "whittle away" at these challenges, because they may be "too big" 
to handle through any single approach. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 11, at 7.  In Massachusetts 
v. EPA, the Supreme Court acknowledged that there is likely to be no easy fix to climate change 
and that, in particular, EPA mobile source requirements at issue in the case would not suffice as 
a regulatory tool for solving the climate change challenge regardless of their content. See 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (recognizing uncertainty surrounding various 
aspects of climate change). 
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The quest for effective and efficient climate solutions raises the following 
seven sets of governance issue, among others.60  First, there is our current legal 
framework.  Are current laws adequate?  If not, how should we revise them to 
improve our capacity to address climate change effectively?  An important goal, 
presumably, is to develop clear objectives, charge appropriate entities with 
fulfilling those objectives, provide them with sufficient tools and incentives, 
monitor their performance, and have the capacity to adapt to new learning—a 
form of adaptive governance.61  While there is evidence that the new 
Administration is likely to pursue efforts to regulate CO2 under the Clean Air 
Act,62 consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,63 
this is only a small aspect of the "legal framework" issue.  There are significant 
questions concerning the appropriateness of the current Clean Air Act and its 
NAAQS regime for addressing climate solutions.64  We are early on in what is 
                                                                                                                 
 60. In addition to the issues I summarize in the text, for example, another issue concerns 
whether President Obama’s creation of various "czars," appointments that do not require 
confirmation, including one for energy, raises constitutional concerns and may limit  
Congressional oversight.  See, e.g., Tom Hamburger & Christi Parsons, Whitehouse Czar 
Inflation Stirs Concern, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, at 1, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/05/nation/na-obama-czars5?pg=4 ("[S]ome lawmakers and 
outside experts fear that Obama is setting up a system that is not subject to congressional 
oversight."). 
 61. See William J. Wailand, Evolving Strategies for Twenty-First Century Natural 
Resource Problems, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1518, 1519–20 (2006) (applying adaptive governance to 
paper management); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act:  Building 
Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 49–53 (2008) (discussing adaptive 
management measures at the Fish and Wildlife Service); Robin Kundis Craig, The Clean Water 
Act on the Cutting Edge:  Climate Change and Water Quality Regulation 3 (FSU Coll. of Law 
Public Law, Research Paper No. 356, 2009) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1357350 
(noting the problems of information generation, climate change mitigation, and climate change 
adaptation). 
 62. See Editorial, The Next Step on Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2009, at A24, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/31/opinion/31sat2.html (describing a memo by 
EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson vowing to address climate change under the Clean Air Act); 
Anthony Lacey, Jackson Sees EPA Flexibility When Crafting GHG Rules Under Air Act, 20 
CLEAN AIR REPORT, Mar. 5, 2009 (discussing Administrator Jackson’s commitment to 
addressing climate change through a flexible regulatory framework that does not unduly burden 
small business).   As this article was well into its final editing, EPA issued its endangerment 
finding under the Clean Air Act. 
 63. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 500 (finding that the regulation of tailpipe emissions 
of GHGs falls within EPA’s mandate under the Clean Air Act to regulate any air pollutant that 
endangers public welfare). 
 64. A March 26, 2009, Clean Air Act conference at Duke University considered precisely 
this issue and featured a lively debate.  See Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Pol'y Solutions, Regulating 
Climate:  What Role for the Clean Air Act?, 
http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/institute/clean.air.2009.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2009); 
Regulating Greenhouse Gases Under the Clean Air Act:  Testimony on H.R. 6666 Before the S. 
64 1 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV'T 49 (2010) 
likely to be a contentious and lively debate concerning the need for legislative 
fixes.65 
Second, are our federal agencies (and their Congressional overseers) 
structured effectively?  There is already evidence (indeed, proof) that at least 
the new Administration thinks significant institutional change is needed.  
President Obama has named Carol Browner, EPA’s former Administrator, to a 
new position as White House Coordinator of energy and climate policy—to be 
a new "Climate Czar," as the New York Times put it.66  In appointing Ms. 
Browner, President Obama said that, "Carol understands that our efforts to 
create jobs, achieve energy security and combat climate change demand 
integration among different agencies; cooperation between federal, state and 
local governments; and partnership with the private sector."67  The creation of 
this new position raises numerous questions.  To list three:  1) What will be the 
relationship of Ms. Browner’s office with EPA and CEQ, and with other 
federal agencies with a natural resources focus such as DOI?; 2) What will be 
the “czar’s” relationship with other key federal actors, such as the National 
Security Council, the National Economic Council, and the Department of Labor 
(responsible for implementation of the Federal Green Jobs Act)?;68 and 3) What 
relationship will it forge with the states, with local governments, and with the 
private sector and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)?  These issues raise 
questions concerning the nature of horizontal as well as vertical governance.69   
                                                                                                                 
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 110th Cong. (2008), available at 
http://www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/eaf66mxsezcul2vb2cuvpfoooncyhpyshcxpc7zzbsvgre
uv4uh5zc2p6csnbnom6aw7qszmg5axla43722hyxeshfe/080923_epa_Kovacss_testimony.pdf 
(statement of William L. Kovacs, Vice President, Environment, Technology and Regulatory 
Affairs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce); Joanna Franco, Supreme Court Emissions Ruling Could 
Create Legacy of Regulations Grappling, 23 OCTANE WEEK, Apr. 7, 2008. 
 65. My colleagues J.B. Ruhl and Robin Craig are among the scholars who have 
considered legislative fixes for aspects of "good governance" in this arena.  See Ruhl, supra note 
4; Craig, supra note 61, at 14.   Michael Vandenbergh and others have discussed opportunities 
to reduce emissions from individuals. 
 66. See Broder, supra note 2, at A28.  
 67. Stephen Dinan, Obama Climate Czar Has Socialist Ties, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009, 
at 1. 
 68. See H.R. Res. 3221, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted) (incorporating the Green Jobs Act 
of 2007, H.R. 2847, 110th Cong. (2007)); Balducci, supra note 42, at 35. 
 69. See Broder, supra note 2, at A28 ("How much real authority will Ms. Browner wield? 
 Will her office have the same bureaucratic clout . . . as the National Security Council and the 
National Economic Council? . . . .  The transition team is still trying to draw the increasingly 
complex White House organization chart.")  "Ms. Browner is informally known within the 
transition and in the environmental community as the ‘climate czarina,’ a title that conceals as 
much as it reveals."  Id. 
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Related, it is unclear whether the Administration’s apparent predisposition 
to embrace institutional change signals it may revisit the structure and 
operations of existing organizations like EPA.  EPA is famous for its media-
specific approach to many environmental problems, despite periodic efforts to 
bring more of a multimedia perspective to issues.70  What does the new office 
tell us about the appropriateness of EPA’s current structure, or about the 
prospects for a change in that structure?  The last time EPA was significantly 
reorganized was in 1994, when Carol Browner was the Administrator.71  Parts 
of several media programs were moved to the enforcement office—OECA, 
among other changes. 72  It remains to be seen whether the new 
Administration’s emphasis on climate solutions will lead it to make significant 
changes in how EPA (among other federal entities) is structured and, if so, 
what that new structure will look like.   
Third, climate change may also trigger new looks at regional governance 
in some contexts.  A small number of regional climate change programs have 
already been implemented.  Most notably, the northeastern states have formed 
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) to develop a cap-and-trade 
system for electric utilities.73  Other states have begun to follow suit.  It remains 
to be seen whether new regional or other structures will emerge and how such 
organizations will fare over time. 
Fourth, effectively developing and implementing climate solutions is 
likely to require rethinking of the organizational structure of our states.  Are 
states organized to engage in integrated sustainable development through their 
environmental, economic development, labor, and other departments?  Will 
states decide to follow the lead of the early Obama Administration decision to 
create an overarching position of "Climate Czar," in order to facilitate 
coordination among, and to provide direction to, the different components of 
government?  Or will the smaller scale of state government (at least in some 
cases) make it unnecessary to undertake this potentially dramatic 
reconfiguration of the shape of government?  Several states have already begun 
to superimpose special institutions on existing governmental structures in order 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See U.S. EPA, FINAL FY 96/97 OECA MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT GUIDANCE 1, 28 
(1997), available at http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/resources/policies/data/planning/96-
97moa.pdf. 
 71. See Michael M. Stahl, Enforcement in Transition, ENVTL. F. 19, 21 (1995). 
 72. See id. 
 73. See Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate Change 
Legislation:  The Value of State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 791, 816 
(2008). 
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to address climate change-related issues.74  It is clear that expertise from a wide 
range of disciplines will be needed to develop and implement climate solutions; 
there are a wide variety of options for structural arrangements to bring these 
capacities and expertise to the table and it remains to be seen how different 
states will reconfigure their governance structures to meet these challenges. 
A fifth essential governance structure question involves the appropriate 
relationship between states and local governments.  In addition to having their 
own responsibilities as regulated parties, local governments exercise much of 
the land use regulatory authority in the United States.75  Climate solutions 
inevitably will need to include close attention to land use regulation.  For 
example, LEED and Energy Star standards can be integrated into local building 
codes.76  Land use regulation can also be used to encourage communities to 
create more appealing pedestrian areas, reducing automobile usage.  In 
addition, regulations set the tone in determining how welcome alternative 
energy sources such as solar and wind power will be in a community.77 
California has recently taken legislative action to integrate land use 
planning into the State’s efforts to address concerns about climate change.  
Senate Bill 375, adopted in 2008, is intended to link land use planning and 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction in California.78  According to various 
commentators, SB 375 has the potential to "change dramatically both 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See Balducci, supra note 42, at 35 (summarizing new institutional arrangements in 
states such as Washington, Massachusetts, and California); N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, TAKING 
ACTION IN NEW YORK ON CLIMATE CHANGE 18–27, 54 (2009) (summarizing the significant 
number of government agencies and others involved in climate change).  The New York DEC 
created an Office of Climate Change in 2007 within the Department to develop programs for 
climate change; the Department of State is responsible for issuing rules to update the State’s 
Energy Conservation and Construction Code; the Governor’s Office of Regulatory Reform is 
involved in such rule development as well; the Public Service Commission, NYSERDA, and the 
New York Power Authority have significant roles; and a host of new entities have been created 
to address climate change, including a legislatively-created Sea Level Risk Task Force (2007), a 
State Renewable Energy Task Force (June 2007), a Smart Growth Cabinet (via a 2007 
Executive Order), and an Interagency Committee on Sustainability and Green Procurement (via 
a 2008 Executive Order)).  Id.   
 75. See Patricia E. Salkin, Smart Growth and the Greening of Comprehensive Plans and 
Land Use Regulation, A.L.I-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY LAND USE INST. 437, 438–39 (2008). 
 76. See, e.g., Mark J. Bennett et al., Sustainability Due Diligence:  LEED as the Evolving 
National Standard, 39 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1783, 1783 (Sept. 5, 2008) (providing an overview of 
LEED and suggesting the increasing importance of LEED certification). 
 77. See Salkin, supra note 75, at 448. 
 78. See Mary D. Nichols, California’s Climate Change Program:  Lessons for the Nation, 
27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 185, 207–08 (2009). 
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California’s land use planning system and growth patterns." 79  And it is 
expected to have a significant effect on reductions in emissions.   
The locus of authority to make land use decisions has received enormous 
attention in recent years.80  Debate concerning whether climate change requires 
a different (and greater) state role is inevitably going to increase substantially in 
the near future.  Other states will need to confront the same issues that 
California seeks to address in SB 375.  Though answers may vary, concerns 
about climate change are likely to engender efforts by state government to use 
land use planning and regulatory tools as part of their tool boxes to reduce 
emissions.  States will need to consider whether they need to reallocate power 
to use these tools to maximize their promise. 
A sixth issue regarding the implications of climate change concerns for the 
structure of governance is whether our primary model for environmental 
regulation in the United States, notably that of cooperative federalism, requires 
tweaking or a more fundamental revamping.  As most readers are well aware, 
the major U.S. environmental regulatory statutes, notably the Clean Air Act 
(CAA),81 Clean Water Act (CWA), 82 and the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA), 83 are structured in the same basic way:  Congress has 
established various normative goals (eliminating water pollution from point 
sources by 1983, for example); 84 it has charged the U.S. EPA with 
responsibility for achieving these goals and created permitting and other 
mechanisms for the Agency to use in doing so;85  and Congress has authorized, 
or in some cases directed, EPA to delegate to qualified and interested states the 
power to play the lead role in implementing their own versions of the federal 
laws.86  Under this system, which is how most of our environmental regulatory 
statutes are structured, including the CAA and CWA, authority tends to be split 
between the federal government and the states for much of the work.  
                                                                                                                 
 79. Paul Shigley, SB 375 Continues to Dominate Planning Discussion, Jan. 26, 2009, 
http://www.cp-dr.com/node/2239 (last visited Nov. 20, 2009). 
 80. See DAVID L. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LAND USE 767 (5th ed. 2008). 
 81. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006). 
 82. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006). 
 83. See 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (2006). 
 84. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006). 
 85. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006).  
 86. See, e.g., ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:  LAW AND 
POLICY 988 (5th ed. 2007); 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006). Some environmental statutes follow 
different approaches, such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).  See 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601–9676 (2006); 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2629 (2006).    
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Particularly as changes emerge in how the federal and state governments re-
structure themselves internally to address climate change,87 these changes, in 
addition to changes in underlying goals and programs, will require attention to 
the structure of state/federal relations.88   
A final "governance structure" question that is likely to be influenced by 
the challenge of climate change relates to changes in relationships between and 
among government organizations, regulated parties, non-governmental 
organizations, and "ordinary" citizens.  For example, the pressures that climate 
change is likely to place on governance may influence the shape and function 
of "governance networks" that participate in shaping and implementing 
environmental law and policy.89  This effect on governance is different from the 
influence of climate change on the structure of particular government 
institutions or the ways in which such government entities interact.  The shape 
of governance is evolving to respond to current challenges and will continue to 
do so; climate change pressures are likely to influence the pace and nature of 
this evolution.90 
Jonathan Wiener has used the phrase "radiative forcing" to suggest that 
climate policy may "break the logjam in environmental law."91  This Part 
identifies some of the key possible drivers of potentially transformative changes 
in our structures of governance that policy makers and others may decide are 
needed to address the concerns that Professor Wiener and others have raised 
about our current structure, such as fragmentation, insensitivity to trade-offs, 
and mismatched scale.92  There is a burgeoning literature concerning 
                                                                                                                 
 87. See supra pp. 16–17 and note 74. 
 88. For different views on these issues, see, for example, Jonathan B. Wiener, Think 
Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 101 
(2007); Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States:  A Regional 
Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 54 (2005); Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A 
Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation:  
The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 579 (2007); Thomas D. Peterson 
et al., Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change Policy in the United States 
that Fully Integrates Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 27 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 227, 227 
(2008). 
 89. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 1 (1997); Eric Orts & Cary Coglianese, Collaborative Environmental Law:  
Pro and Con, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 289, 289 (2007). 
 90. See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 11; Alex Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate 
Change:  Learning to Manage Uncertainty, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (2009). 
 91. Wiener, supra note 18, at 2–3.  The NYU Environmental Law Journal recently 
devoted a volume to consideration of this "breaking the logjam" challenge.  See generally 
Symposium:  Breaking the Logjam:  Environmental Reform for the New Congress and 
Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2008). 
 92. See Wiener, supra note 18, at 2–3 ("A serious policy to combat climate change can—
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governance for sustainability;93 as existing governance structures prove 
ineffectual, or are so perceived, we will need to design, often by improvisation, 
new governance structures.  President Obama’s initial salvo signals his belief 
that such new structures are essential.  Recent developments of the sort I 
describe above in each of these seven areas may well foreshadow more 
substantial and permanent changes.94 
V. Conclusion 
At least for the next several years, climate change is likely to be viewed as 
a central governance challenge, assuming that other, more immediate 
challenges (war, economic collapse, etc.) do not materialize that take up the 
                                                                                                                 
and should—radiate a powerful influence, driving important improvements in environmental 
law . . . .  [W]ell designed climate policy will both address the climate problem and help ‘break 
the logjam’ by propelling significant reforms in the structure of U.S. environmental 
governance."); David L. Markell, States as Innovators:  It's Time For a New Look To Our 
"Laboratories of Democracy" in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental 
Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 390 (1994).  Scholarship in areas such as "Dynamic 
Federalism," "New Governance," and "Transgovernmental Networks" may inform the debate 
about relationships within, between, and among different levels of government and other key 
actors.  J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman have reviewed scholarship in each of these areas.  See, 
e.g., Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 11.  Beyond these governance issues at the national and sub-
national levels, climate change obviously raises fundamental issues of governance at the 
regional level and beyond.  The new U.S. administration has expressed its intent to "re-engage" 
with the United Nations process.  BarackObama.com, New Energy for America, 
http://www.barackobama.com/issues/newenergy/index.php (last visited Nov. 20, 2009) 
(indicating that President Obama and Vice President Biden plan to "re engage with the U.N. 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC)—the main international forum dedicated 
to addressing the climate problem").  They will also invigorate the Major Economies (MEM) 
effort and bring all the major emitting nations together to develop effective emissions reduction 
efforts."  Id.  In addition to the possibility that attempts at regional and/or global governance 
will shift power from national and sub-national governments to other institutions, such attempts 
also have implications for distribution of power domestically.      
 93. See, e.g., John C. Dernbach, Navigating the U.S. Transition to Sustainability:  
Matching National Governance Challenges with Appropriate Legal Tools, 44 TULSA L.J. 93, 93 
(2008) (containing a helpful overview of some of this literature); John C. Dernbach, National 
Governance:  Still Stumbling Toward Sustainability, in AGENDA FOR A SUSTAINABLE AMERICA 
10,321, 10,321 (John C. Dernbach ed., Envtl. L. Inst. 2009).    
 94. Lessons from our efforts to address climate change may well shape approaches 
intended to move toward sustainable development more generally.  We have a considerable 
amount to learn in moving in that direction.  As John Dernbach has noted, "the systematic 
integration of environment with development raises problem-solving issues with which we have 
relatively little experience."  See Dernbach, supra note 93, at 98.  Professor Dernbach suggests 
that the legal foundation for sustainable development "has received less attention than it 
deserves."  See Dernbach, supra note 93, at 94. 
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"air" of ongoing policy deliberations and actions of government.95  We are very 
much finding our way at all stages of the effort needed to develop an effective 
strategy (or set of strategies) for addressing this challenge.  This article 
identifies at least three of the factors policy makers and others need to keep in 
mind as they seek to move forward productively.  Much remains to be done to 
"drill down" into each of these sets of issues to understand the options and the 
implications of different choices.  Hopefully this article will be a modest 
contribution to the effort to do just that. 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Threats from terrorist attacks generally and from countries like Iran in particular loom 
and we are only another attack on domestic soil along the lines of 9/11 away from having these 
concerns move well up on the public agenda.  The enormous financial challenges that the 
country and the world face, similarly, have the potential to influence or shape the agenda on 
climate change in fundamental ways. 
